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Abstract
Bitcoin is an immutable permissionless blockchain system that has been extensively
used as a public bulletin board by many different applications that heavily relies on its
immutability. However, Bitcoin’s immutability is not without its fair share of demerits. In-
terpol exposed the existence of harmful and potentially illegal documents, images and links
in the Bitcoin blockchain, and since then there have been several qualitative and quantita-
tive analysis on the types of data currently residing in the Bitcoin blockchain. Although
there is a lot of attention on blockchains, surprisingly the previous solutions proposed for
data redaction in the permissionless setting are far from feasible, and require additional
trust assumptions. Hence, the problem of harmful data still poses a huge challenge for law
enforcement agencies like Interpol (Tziakouris, IEEE S&P’18).
We propose the first efficient redactable blockchain for the permissionless setting that is
easily integrable into Bitcoin, and that does not rely on heavy cryptographic tools or trust
assumptions. Our protocol uses a consensus-based voting and is parameterised by a policy
that dictates the requirements and constraints for the redactions; if a redaction gathers
enough votes the operation is performed on the chain. As an extra feature, our protocol
offers public verifiability and accountability for the redacted chain. Moreover, we provide
formal security definitions and proofs showing that our protocol is secure against redactions
that were not agreed by consensus. Additionally, we show the viability of our approach with
a proof-of-concept implementation that shows only a tiny overhead in the chain validation
of our protocol when compared to an immutable one.
∗Work done while the author was affiliated with Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg.
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1 Introduction
Satoshi Nakamoto’s 2008 proposal of Bitcoin [38] has revolutionised the financial sector. It
helped realise a monetary system without relying on a central trusted authority, which has
since then given rise to hundreds of new systems known as cryptocurrencies. Interestingly
however, a closer look into the basics of Bitcoin sheds light on a new technology, blockchains.
Ever since, there has been a lot of ongoing academic research [21, 28, 14, 16] on the security
and applications of blockchains as a primitive. A blockchain in its most primitive form is a
decentralised chain of agreed upon blocks containing timestamped data.
A consensus mechanism supports the decentralised nature of blockchains. There are different
types of consensus mechanisms that are based on different resources, such as Proof of Work
(PoW) based on computational power, Proof of Stake (PoS) based on the stake in the system,
Proof of Space based on storage capacity, among many others. Typically, users in the system
store a local copy of the blockchain and run the consensus mechanism to agree on a unified view
of the blockchain. These mechanisms must rely on non-replicability of resources to be resilient
against simple sybil attacks where the adversary spawn multiple nodes under his control.
Apart from its fundamental purpose of being a digital currency, Bitcoin exploits the prop-
erties of its blockchain, as in being used as a tool for many different applications, such as
timestamp service [23, 22], to achieve fairness and correctness in secure multi-party computa-
tion [9, 7, 15, 31], and to build smart contracts [30]. It acts as an immutable public bulletin
board, supporting the storage of arbitrary data through special operations. For instance, the
OP RETURN code, can take up to 80 bytes of arbitrary data that gets stored in the blockchain.
With no requirement for centralised trust and its capability of supporting complex smart con-
tracts, communication through the blockchain has become practical, reasonably inexpensive
and very attractive for applications.
Blockchain and Immutability. The debate about the immutability of blockchain protocols
has gained worldwide attention lately due to the adoption of the new General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) by European states. Several provisions of the GDPR regulation are inher-
ently incompatible with current permissionless immutable blockchain proposals (e.g., Bitcoin
and Ethereum) [26] as it is not possible to remove any data (addresses, transaction values,
timestamp information) that has stabilised1 in the chain in such protocols. Since permissionless
blockchains are completely decentralised and allow for any user to post transactions to the chain
for a small fee, malicious users can post transactions to the system containing illegal and/or
harmful data, such as (child) pornography, private information or stolen private keys, etc. The
existence of such illicit content was first reported in [2] and has remained a challenge for law
enforcement agencies like Interpol [46]. Moreover, quantitative analysis in the recent work of
Matzutt et al. [34] shows that it is not feasible to “filter” all data from incoming transactions to
check for malicious contents before the transaction is inserted into the chain. Therefore, once it
becomes public knowledge that malicious data was inserted (and has stabilised) into the chain,
the honest users are faced with the choice of either, willingly broadcast illicit (and possibly
illegal [34, 5]) data to other users, or to stop using the system altogether.
This effect greatly hinders the adoption of permissionless blockchain systems, as honest users
that are required to comply with regulations, such as GDPR, are forced to withdraw themselves
from the system if there is no recourse in place to deal with illicit data inserted into the chain.
1A transaction (or data) is considered stable in the blockchain when it is “deep” enough into the chain. We
formally define this property in Section 2.2.
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1.1 State of the Art
Specifically to tackle the problem of arbitrary harmful data insertions in the blockchain, the
notion of redacting the contents of a blockchain was first proposed by Ateniese et al. [13].
The authors propose a solution more focused on the permissioned blockchain setting2 based
on chameleon hashes [18]. In their protocol, a chameleon hash function replaces the regular
SHA256 hash function when linking consecutive blocks in the chain. When a block is modified,
a collision for the chameleon hash function can be efficiently computed (with the knowledge
of the chameleon trapdoor key) for that block, keeping the state of the chain consistent after
arbitrary modifications.
In a permissioned setting where the control of the chain is shared among a few semi-trusted
parties, the solution from [13] is elegant and works nicely, being even commercially adopted
by a large consultancy company [4, 3, 11]. However, in permissionless blockchains such as
Bitcoin, where the influx of users joining and leaving the system is ever changing and without
any regulation, their protocol clearly falls short in this scenario, as their techniques of secret
sharing the chameleon trapdoor key and running a MPC protocol to compute a collision for
the chameleon hash function do not scale to the thousands of users in the Bitcoin network.
Moreover, when a block is removed in their protocol it is completely unnoticeable to the users,
leaving no trace of the old state. Although this could make sense in a permissioned setting, in a
permissionless setting one would like to have some public accountability as to when and where
a redaction has occurred.
Later, Puddu et al. [42] proposed a blockchain protocol where the sender of a transaction can
encrypt alternate versions of the transaction data, known as “mutations”; the only unencrypted
version of the transaction is considered to be the active transaction. The decryption keys are
secret shared among the miners, and the sender of a transaction establishes a mutation policy
for his transaction, that details how (and by whom) his transaction is allowed to be mutated.
On receiving a mutate request, the miners run a MPC protocol to reconstruct the decryption
key and decrypt the appropriate version of the transaction. The miners then publish this new
version as the active transaction. In case of permissionless blockchains, they propose the usage
of voting for gauging approval based on computational power. However, in a permissionless
setting a malicious user can simply not include a mutation for his transaction, or even set a
mutation policy where only he himself is able to mutate the transaction. Moreover, to tackle
transaction consistency, where a mutated transaction affects other transactions in the chain,
they propose to mutate all affected transactions through a cascading effect. This however,
completely breaks the notion of transaction stability, e.g., a payment made in the past to a
user could be altered as a result of this cascading mutation. The proposal of [42] also suffers
from scalability issues due to the MPC protocol used for reconstructing decryption keys across
different users.
It is clear that for a permissionless blockchain without centralised trust assumptions, a
practical solution for redacting harmful content must refrain from employing large-scale MPC
protocols that hinders the performance of the blockchain. It also must accommodate public
verifiability and accountability such that rational miners are incentivised to follow the protocol.
1.2 Our Contributions
Editable Blockchain Protocol. We propose the first editable blockchain protocol for per-
missionless systems in Section 3, which is completely decentralised and does not rely on heavy
2The permissioned blockchain setting is when there is a trusted third party (TTP) that deliberates on the
users’ entry into the system.
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cryptographic primitives or additional trust assumptions. This makes our protocol easily inte-
grable in systems like Bitcoin (as described in Section 5). The edit operations can be proposed
by any user and they are voted in the blockchain through consensus; the edits are only per-
formed if approved by the blockchain policy (e.g., voted by the majority). The protocol is based
on a PoW consensus, however, it can be easily adapted to any consensus mechanism, since the
core ideas are inherently independent of the type of consensus used. Our protocol also offers
accountability for edit operations, where any edit in the chain can be publicly verified.
Formal Analysis. We build our protocol on firm theoretical grounds, as we formalise all
the necessary properties of an editable blockchain in Section 4, and later show that our generic
protocol of Section 3.3 satisfies these properties. We borrow the fundamental properties of a
secure blockchain protocol from [21] and adapt them to our setting.
Implementation. We demonstrate the practicality of our protocol with a proof-of-concept
implementation in Python. We first show in Section 6 that adding our redaction mechanism
incurs in just a small overhead for chain validation time compared to that of the immutable
protocol. Then, we show that for our protocol the overhead incurred for different numbers of
redactions in the chain against a redactable chain with no redactions is minimal (less than 3% for
5, 000 redactions on a 50, 000 blocks chain). Finally, we analyse the effect of the parameters in
our protocol by measuring the overhead introduced by different choices of the system parameters
when validating chains with redactions.
1.3 Our Protocol
Our protocol extends the immutable blockchain of Garay et al. [21] to accommodate for edit
operations in the following way: We extend the block structure to accommodate another copy
of the transaction’s Merkle root, that we denote by old state. We also consider an editing policy
for the chain, that determines the constraints and requirements for approving edit operations.
To edit a block in the chain, our protocol (Fig. 1) executes the following steps:
a) A user first proposes an edit request to the system. The request consists of the index of
the block he wants to edit, and a candidate block to replace it.
b) When miners in the network receives an edit request, they first validate the candidate
block using its old state information and verifying the following conditions: (1) it contains
the correct information about the previous block, (2) it has solved the proof of work and
(3) it does not invalidate the next block in the chain. If the candidate block is valid,
miners can vote for it during the request’s voting period by simply including the hash of
the request in the next block they mine. The collision resistance property of the hash
function ensures that a vote for an edit request cannot be considered as a vote for any
other edit request.
c) After the voting period for a request is over, everyone in the network can verify if the edit
request was approved in accordance to the policy (e.g., by checking the number of votes it
received). If the request was approved, then the edit operation is performed by replacing
the original block with the candidate block.
To validate an edited chain, the miners validate each block exactly like in the immutable
protocol; if a “broken” link is found between blocks, the miner checks if the link still holds for
the old state information3. In the affirmative case, the miner ensures that the edited block has
gathered enough votes and is approved, according to the policy of the chain.
The process of a redaction in our generic protocol as described in Fig. 2 is pictorially pre-
sented in Fig. 1.
3A similar technique is used in [10] to “scar” a block that was previously redacted.
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Figure 1: The candidate block pool R stores the candidate blocks that are proposed and that
can be endorsed in the voting phase. A block is linked to its predecessor by two links, the old
link (solid arrow) and the new link (dashed arrow). In (a), a redact request B⋆j is proposed as
a redaction for Bj and added to R, then the hash of B
⋆
j is included in the chain to denote a
new candidate redaction; its voting phase starts just after its proposal. In (b), the candidate
block B⋆j has gathered enough votes and was approved by the redaction policy P of the chain;
B⋆j replaces Bj and the redacted chain is propagated. Note that new link from the block to the
right of B⋆j is broken (marked by a cross), however the old link to B
⋆
j still holds. For simplicity,
we consider the parameters k = 0 (persistence), ℓ = 4 (voting period) and ρ ≥ 3/4 (threshold
for policy approval).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this work we denote by κ ∈ N the security parameter and by a← A(in) the output
of an algorithm A on input in. We also use the terms “redact” and “edit” interchangeably in
this paper.
2.1 Blockchain Basics
We make use of the notation of [21] to describe a blockchain. A block is a triple of the form
B := 〈s, x, ctr 〉, where s ∈ {0, 1}κ, x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and ctr ∈ N. Here s is the state of the previous
block, x is the data and ctr is the proof of work of the block. A block B is valid iff
validateBlockD(B) := H(ctr , G(s, x)) < D.
Here, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ and G : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ are cryptographic hash functions, and
the parameter D ∈ N is the block’s difficulty level.
The blockchain is simply a chain (or sequence) of blocks, that we call C. The rightmost
block is called the head of the chain, denoted by Head(C). Any chain C with a head Head(C) :=
〈s, x, ctr 〉 can be extended to a new longer chain C′ := C||B′ by attaching a (valid) block
B′ := 〈s′, x′, ctr ′〉 such that s′ = H(ctr , G(s, x)); the head of the new chain C′ is Head(C′) := B′.
A chain C can also be empty, and in such a case we let C := ε. The function len(C) denotes the
length of a chain C (i.e., its number of blocks). For a chain C of length n and any q ≥ 0, we
denote by C⌈q the chain resulting from removing the q rightmost blocks of C, and analogously
we denote by q⌉C the chain resulting in removing the q leftmost blocks of C; note that if q ≥ n
(where len(C) = n) then C⌈q := ε and q⌉C := ε. If C is a prefix of C′ we write C ≺ C′. We also
note that the difficulty level D can be different among blocks in a chain.
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2.2 Properties of a Secure Blockchain
In this section we detail the relevant aspects of the underlying blockchain system that is required
for our protocol.
We consider time to be divided into standard discrete units, such as minutes. A well defined
continuous amount of these units is called a slot. Each slot sl l is indexed for l ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
We assume that users have a synchronised clock that indicates the current time down to the
smallest discrete unit. The users execute a distributed protocol to generate a new block in each
slot, where a block contains some data. We assume the slots’ real time window properties as
in [28]. In [21, 39, 28] it is shown that a “healthy” blockchain must satisfy the properties of
persistence and liveness, which intuitively guarantee that after some time period, all honest
users of the system will have a consistent view of the chain, and transactions posted by honest
users will eventually be included. We informally discuss the two properties next.
Persistence: Once a user in the system announces a particular transaction as stable, all of the
remaining users when queried will either report the transaction in the same position in the
ledger or will not report any other conflicting transaction as stable. A system parameter k
determines the number of blocks that stabilise a transaction. That is, a transaction is stable if
the block containing it has at least k blocks following it in the blockchain. We only consider a
transaction to be in the chain after it becomes stable.
Liveness: If all the honest users in the system attempt to include a certain transaction into their
ledger, then after the passing of time corresponding to u slots which represents the transaction
confirmation time, all users, when queried and responding honestly, will report the transaction
as being stable.
Throughout the paper we refer to the user as both a user and a miner interchangeably.
2.3 Execution Model.
In the following we define the notation for our protocol executions. Our definitions follow along
the same lines of [41].
A protocol refers to an algorithm for a set of interactive Turing Machines (also called nodes)
to interact with each other. The execution of a protocol Π that is directed by an environmen-
t/outer game Z(1κ), which activates a number of parties U = {p1, . . . , pn} as either honest or
corrupted parties. Honest parties would faithfully follow the protocol’s prescription, whereas
corrupt parties are controlled by an adversary A, which reads all their inputs/messages and
sets their outputs/messages to be sent.
• A protocol’s execution proceeds in rounds that model atomic time steps. At the beginning
of every round, honest parties receive inputs from an environment Z; at the end of every
round, honest parties send outputs to the environment Z.
• A is responsible for delivering all messages sent by parties (honest or corrupted) to all
other parties. A cannot modify the content of messages broadcast by honest parties.
• At any point Z can corrupt an honest party j, which means that A gets access to its local
state and subsequently controls party j.
• At any point of the execution, Z can uncorrupt a corrupted party j, which means that
A no longer controls j. A party that becomes uncorrupt is treated in the same way as a
newly spawning party, i.e., the party’s internal state is re-initialised and then the party
starts executing the honest protocol no longer controlled by A.
Note that a protocol execution can be randomised, where the randomness comes from honest
parties as well as from A and Z. We denote by view ← EXECΠ(A,Z, κ) the randomly sampled
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execution trace. More formally, view denotes the joint view of all parties (i.e., all their inputs,
random coins and messages received, including those from the random oracle) in the above
execution; note that this joint view fully determines the execution.
3 Editing the Blockchain
In this section we introduce an abstraction Γ of a blockchain protocol, and we describe how to
extend Γ into an editable blockchain protocol Γ′.
3.1 Blockchain Protocol
We consider an immutable blockchain protocol (for instance [21]), denoted by Γ, where nodes
receive inputs from the environment Z, and interact among each other to agree on an ordered
ledger that achieves persistence and liveness. The blockchain protocol Γ is characterised by a
set of global parameters and by a public set of rules for validation. The protocol Γ provides
the nodes with the following set of interfaces which are assumed to have complete access to the
network and its users.
• {C′,⊥} ← Γ.updateChain: returns a longer and valid chain C in the network (if it exists),
otherwise returns ⊥.
• {0, 1} ← Γ.validateChain(C): The chain validity check takes as input a chain C and returns
1 iff the chain is valid according to a public set of rules.
• {0, 1} ← Γ.validateBlock(B): The block validity check takes as input a block B and returns
1 iff the block is valid according to a public set of rules.
• Γ.broadcast(x ): takes as input some data x and broadcasts it to all the nodes of the
system.
The nodes in the Γ protocol have their own local chain C which is initialised with a common
genesis block. The consensus in Γ guarantees the properties of persistence and liveness discussed
in Section 2.2.
3.2 Editable Blockchain
We build our editable blockchain protocol Γ′ by modifying and extending the aforementioned
protocol Γ. The protocol Γ′ has copies of all the basic blockchain functionalities exposed by
Γ through the interfaces described above, and modifies the validateChain and validateBlock
algorithms in order to accommodate for edits in C. In addition, the protocol Γ′ provides the
following interfaces:
• B⋆j ← Γ
′.proposeEdit(C, j, x ⋆): takes as input the chain C, an index j of a block to edit
and some data x ⋆. It then returns a candidate block for Bj.
• {0, 1} ← Γ′.validateCand(B⋆j , C): takes as input a candidate block B
⋆
j and the chain C and
returns 1 iff the candidate block B⋆j is valid.
The modified chain validation and block validation algorithms are presented in Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2, respectively, while the new algorithms to propose an edit to a block and to
validate candidate blocks are presented in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, respectively. In Fig. 2
we formally describe the protocol Γ′.
Intuitively, we need modifications for chain validation and block validation algorithms to
account for an edited block in the chain. A block that has been edited possesses a different
state, that does not immediately correlate with its neighbouring blocks. Therefore, for such an
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edited block we need to ensure that the old state of the block (the state before the edit) is still
accessible for verification.4 We do this by storing the old state information in the block itself.
This therefore requires a modified block validation algorithm and a modified chain validation
algorithm overall.
We note that for simplicity our protocol is restricted to perform a single edit operation
per block throughout the run of the protocol. In Appendix A we describe an extension of the
protocol to accommodate for an arbitrary number of redactions per block.
Blockchain Policy. We introduce the notion of a blockchain policy P, that determines if an
edit to the chain C should be approved or not. The protocol Γ′ is parameterised by a policy
P that is a function that takes as input a chain C and a candidate block B⋆ (that proposes a
modification to the chain C) and it returns accept if the candidate block B⋆ complies with the
policy P, otherwise it outputs reject; in case the modification proposed by B⋆ is still being
deliberated in the chain C, then P returns voting.
In its most basic form, a policy P requires that a candidate block B⋆ should only be accepted
if B⋆ was voted by the majority of the network within some predefined interval of blocks (or
voting period ℓ). A formal definition follows.
Definition 1 (Policy). A candidate block B⋆ generated in round r is said to satisfy the policy
P of chain C := (B1, . . . , Bn), i.e., P(C, B
⋆) = accept, if it holds that Br+ℓ ∈ C
⌈k and the ratio
of blocks between Br and Br+ℓ containing H(B
⋆) (a vote for B⋆) is at least ρ, for k, ℓ ∈ N, and
0 < ρ ≤ 1, where k is the persistence parameter, ℓ is the voting period, and ρ is the ratio of
votes necessary within the voting period ℓ.
3.3 Protocol Description
We denote a block to be of the form B := 〈s, x, ctr , y〉, where s ∈ {0, 1}κ is the hash of the
previous block, x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the block data, and y ∈ {0, 1}κ is the old state of the block
data. To extend an editable chain C to a new longer chain C′ := C||B′, the newly created block
B′ := 〈s′, x′, ctr ′, y′〉 sets s′ := H(ctr , G(s, x), y), where Head(C) := 〈s, x, ctr , y〉. Note that
upon the creation of block B′, the component y′ takes the value G(s′, x′), that represents the
initial state of block B′.
During the setup of the system, the chain C is initialised as C := genesis, and all the users
in the system maintain a local copy of the chain C and a pool R consisting candidate blocks for
edits, that is initially empty. The protocol runs in a sequence of rounds r (starting with r := 1).
In the beginning of each round r, the users try to extend their local chain using the interface
Γ′.updateChain, that tries to retrieve new valid blocks from the network and append them to the
local chain. Next, the users collect all the candidate blocks B⋆j from the network and validate
them by using Γ′.validateCand (Algorithm 4); then, the users add all the valid candidate blocks
to the pool R. For each candidate block B⋆j in R, the users compute P(C, B
⋆
j ) to verify if the
candidate block B⋆j should be adopted by the chain or not; if the output is accept they replace
the original block Bj in the chain by the candidate block B
⋆
j and remove B
⋆
j from R. If the
output is reject, the users remove the candidate block B⋆j from R, otherwise if the output
is voting they do nothing. To create a new block B the users collect transactions from the
network and store them in x; if a user wishes to endorse the edit proposed by a candidate block
B⋆j ∈ R that is still in voting stage, the user can vote for the candidate block B
⋆
j by simply
addingH(B⋆j ) to the data x. After the block is created and the new extended chain C
′ := C||B is
built, the users broadcast the new chain C′ iff Γ′.validateChain(C′) = 1 (Algorithm 1). Finally, if
4Note that the protocol does not need to maintain the redacted data for verification, and therefore all redacted
data is completely removed from the chain.
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The protocol Γ′ consists of a sequence of rounds r, and is parameterised by the liveness and
persistence parameters, denoted by u, k, respectively, and by a policy P that among other rules
and constraints, determines the parameter ℓ (that is the duration of the voting period) and ρ
(that is the threshold of votes within the period ℓ for a candidate block to be accepted and
incorporated into the chain). A pictorial representation of the protocol can be found in Fig. 1.
Initialisation. Set the chain C ← genesis, set round r ← 1 and initialise an empty list of
candidate blocks for edits R := ∅.
For each round r of the protocol, we describe the following sequence of execution.
Chain update. At the beginning of a new round r, the nodes try to update their local chain
by calling C ← Γ′.updateChain.
Candidate blocks pool. Collect all candidate blocks B⋆j from the network and add B
⋆
j to
the pool of candidate blocks R iff Γ′.validateCand(C, B⋆j ) = 1; otherwise discard B
⋆
j .
Editing the chain. For all candidate blocks B⋆j ∈ R do:
• If P(C, B⋆j ) = accept, then build the new chain as C ← C
⌈(n−j+1)||B⋆j ||
j⌉C and remove
B⋆j from R. For policy P to accept B
⋆
j , it must be the case that the ratio of votes for B
⋆
j
within its voting period (ℓ blocks) is at least ρ.
• If P(C, B⋆j ) = reject, then remove B
⋆
j from R. For policy P to reject B
⋆
j it must be the
case that the ratio of votes for B⋆j within its voting period (ℓ blocks) is less than ρ.
• If P(C, B⋆j ) = voting, then do nothing.
Creating a new block. Collects all the transaction data x from the network for the r-th
round and tries to build a new block Br by performing the following steps:
• (Voting for candidate blocks). For all candidate blocks B⋆j ∈ R that the node is willing
to endorse, if P(C, B⋆j ) = voting then set x← x||H(B
⋆
j ).
• Create a new block B := 〈s, x, ctr , G(s, x)〉, such that s = H(ctr ′, G(s′, x′), y′), for
〈s′, x′, ctr ′, y′〉 ← Head(C).
• Extend its local chain C ← C||B and iff Γ′.validateChain(C) = 1 then broadcast C to the
network.
Propose an edit. The node willing to propose an edit for the block Bj, for j ∈ [n], creates a
candidate block B⋆j ← Γ
′.proposeEdit(C, j, x ⋆) using the new data x ⋆, and broadcasts it to the
network by calling Γ′.broadcast(B⋆j ).
Figure 2: Accountable permissionless editable blockchain protocol Γ′P
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a user wishes to propose an edit to block Bj in the chain C, she first creates the new data x
⋆
j , that
represents the modifications that she proposes to make to the data xj , and calls proposeEdit
(Algorithm 3) using the interface Γ′.proposeEdit with the chain C, index j of the block in C
and the new data x⋆j . The algorithm returns a candidate block B
⋆
j that is broadcasted to the
network.
Chain Validation. Given a chain C, the user needs to validate C according to some set
of validation rules. To do this, she uses the Γ′.validateChain interface, that is implemented
by Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes as input a chain C and starts validating from the head
of C. In Line 5, the validity of the block Bj is checked. If the assertion in Line 6 is false and
if the check in Line 7 is successful, then the block Bj−1 is a valid edited block. In Line 7, the
validity of Bj−1 is checked in the context of a candidate block and whether the block is accepted
according to the voting policy P of the chain.
Algorithm 1: validateChain (implements Γ′.validateChain)
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n.
output: {0, 1}
1: j := n;
2: if j = 1 then return Γ′.validateBlock(B1);
3: while j ≥ 2 do
4: Bj := 〈sj, xj , ctr j, yj〉 ; ⊲ Bj := Head(C) when j = n
5: if Γ′.validateBlock(Bj) = 0 then return 0;
6: if sj = H(ctr j−1, G(sj−1, xj−1), yj−1) then j := j − 1;
7: else if
(sj = H(ctr j−1, yj−1, yj−1))∧ (Γ
′.validateCand(C, Bj−1) = 1)∧ (P(C, Bj−1) = accept)
then j := j − 1;
8: else return 0;
9: return 1;
Block Validation. To validate a block, the validateBlock algorithm (described in Algorithm 2)
takes as input a block B and first validates the data included in the block according to some
pre-defined validation predicate. It then checks if the block indeed satisfies the constraints of
the PoW puzzle. Apart from this check, the or (∨) condition is to ensure that in case of dealing
with an edited block B, the old state of B still satisfies the PoW constraints.
Algorithm 2: validateBlock (implements Γ′.validateBlock)
input : Block B := 〈s, x, ctr , y〉.
output: {0, 1}
1: Validate data x, if invalid return 0;
2: if H(ctr , G(s, x), y) < D ∨H(ctr , y, y) < D then return 1;
3: else return 0;
Proposing an Edit. Any user in the network can propose for a particular data to be removed
or replaced from the blockchain. She uses the proposeEdit algorithm as described in Algorithm 3
and constructs a candidate block to replace the original block. The algorithm takes as input a
chain C, the index j of the original block and new data x⋆j that will replace the original data. If
the user’s intention is simply to remove all data from block Bj then x
⋆
j := ε. It then generates
a candidate block as the tuple B⋆j := 〈sj, x
⋆
j , ctr j, yj〉.
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Algorithm 3: proposeEdit (implements Γ′.proposeEdit)
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n, an index j ∈ [n], and the new data x
⋆
j .
output: A candidate block B⋆j .
1: Parse Bj := 〈sj , xj, ctr j, yj〉;
2: Build the candidate block B⋆j := 〈sj , x
⋆
j , ctr j , yj〉;
3: return B⋆j ;
Validating Candidate Blocks. When the user wishes to validate a candidate block B⋆j :=
〈sj, x
⋆
j , ctr j, yj〉 for the j-th block of a chain C, she uses validateCand which is described in Al-
gorithm 4. It retrieves the blocks Bj−1 and Bj+1 of index j − 1 and j +1 respectively from the
chain C. In Line 5 it is checked if the link s⋆j from B
⋆
j to Bj−1 holds and that the link sj+1 from
Bj+1 to B
⋆
j also satisfies the condition sj+1 = H(ctrj , yj, yj). The latter condition checks if the
“old link” still holds. If both checks are successful the candidate block B⋆j is considered valid,
otherwise it is considered invalid.
Algorithm 4: validateCand (implements Γ′.validateCand)
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n, and a candidate block B
⋆
j for an edit.
output: {0, 1}
1: Parse B⋆j := 〈sj, x
⋆
j , ctr j , yj〉;
2: if Γ′.validateBlock(B⋆j ) = 0 then return 0;
3: Parse Bj−1 := 〈sj−1, xj−1, ctr j−1, yj−1〉;
4: Parse Bj+1 := 〈sj+1, xj+1, ctr j+1, yj+1〉;
5: if s⋆j = H(ctr j−1, yj−1, yj−1) ∧ sj+1 = H(ctr j , yj, yj) then return 1;
6: else return 0;
4 Security Analysis
In this section we analyse the security of our editable blockchain protocol of Fig. 2.
We assume the existence of an immutable blockchain protocol Γ, as described in Section 3.1,
that satisfies the properties of chain growth, chain quality and common prefix [21]. The basic
intuition behind our security analysis is that, given that Γ satisfies the aforementioned proper-
ties, our editable blockchain protocol Γ′P , (which is Γ
′ parameterised by a policy P), preserves
the same properties (or a variation of the property in the case of common prefix). Therefore,
our protocol behaves exactly like the immutable blockchain Γ when there are no edits in the
chain, and if an edit operation was performed, it must have been approved by the policy P. We
discuss each individual property next.
Chain Growth. The chain growth property from Γ is automatically preserved in our editable
blockchain Γ′, since the possible edits do not allow the removal of blocks or influence the
growth of the chain. We present the formal definition next, followed by a theorem stating that
Γ′ preserves chain growth whenever Γ satisfies chain growth.
Definition 2 (Chain Growth [21]). Consider the chains C1, C2 possessed by two honest parties
at the onset of two slots sl1, sl 2, with sl2 at least s slots ahead of sl1. Then it holds that
len(C2)− len(C1) ≥ τ · s, for s ∈ N and 0 < τ ≤ 1, where τ is the speed coefficient.
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Theorem 1. If Γ satisfies (τ, s)-chain growth, then Γ′P satisfies (τ, s)-chain growth for any
policy P.
Proof. We note that Γ′ extends Γ, that by assumption satisfies chain growth. Also, note that in
Γ′ it is not possible to remove a block from the chain (for any policy P), thereby reducing the
length of C. In other words, the edits performed do not alter the length of the chain. Therefore,
we conclude that Γ′ satisfies chain growth whenever Γ satisfies chain growth.
Chain Quality. The chain quality property informally states that the ratio of adversarial
blocks in any segment of a chain held by a honest party is no more than a fraction µ, where µ
is the fraction of resources controlled by the adversary.
Definition 3 (Chain Quality [21]). Consider a portion of length ℓ-blocks of a chain possessed
by an honest party during any given round, for ℓ ∈ N. Then, the ratio of adversarial blocks in
this ℓ segment of the chain is at most µ, where 0 < µ ≤ 1 is the chain quality coefficient.
Theorem 2. Let H be a collision-resistant hash function. If Γ satisfies (µ, ℓ)-chain quality,
then Γ′P satisfies (µ, ℓ)-chain quality for any (k, ℓ, ρ)-policy where ρ > µ.
Proof. We note that the only difference in Γ′P in relation to Γ is that blocks can be edited.
An adversary A could edit an honest block B in the chain C into a malicious block B⋆ (e.g.,
that contains illegal content), increasing the proportion of malicious blocks in the chain, and
therefore breaking the chain quality property. We show below that A has only a negligible
probability of violating chain quality of Γ′.
Let A propose a malicious candidate block B⋆j for editing an honest block Bj ∈ C. Since
A possesses only µ computational power, by the chain quality property of Γ we know that the
adversary mines at most µ ratio of blocks in the voting phase. As the policy stipulates, the
ratio of votes has to be at least ρ for B⋆ to be approved, where ρ > µ. Therefore, B⋆ can only
be approved by the policy P if honest nodes vote for it. Observe that the adversary could try
to build an “honest looking” (e.g., without illegal contents) candidate block B˜⋆ 6= B⋆ such that
H(B˜⋆) = H(B⋆), in an attempt to deceive the honest nodes during the voting phase; the honest
nodes could endorse the candidate block B⋆ during the voting phase, and the adversary would
instead edit the chain with the malicious block B˜⋆. The adversary has only a negligible chance
of producing such a candidate block B⋆ where H(B˜⋆) = H(B⋆), since this would violate the
collision-resistance property of the hash function H.
Moreover, B⋆ is incorporated to the chain only if it is an honest candidate block. This
concludes the proof.
Common Prefix. The common prefix property informally says that if we take the chains of
two honest nodes at different time slots, the shortest chain is a prefix of the longest chain (up
to the common prefix parameter k). We show the formal definition next.
Definition 4 (Common Prefix [21]). The chains C1, C2 possessed by two honest parties at the
onset of the slots sl1 < sl2 are such that C
⌈k
1  C2, where C
⌈k
1 denotes the chain obtained by
removing the last k blocks from C1, where k ∈ N is the common prefix parameter.
We remark however, that our protocol Γ′P inherently does not satisfy Definition 4. To see
this, consider the case where two chains C1 and C2 are held by two honest parties P1 and P2 at
slots sl1 and sl2 respectively, such that sl1 < sl2. In slot r starts the voting phase (that lasts ℓ
blocks) for a candidate block B⋆j proposing to edit block Bj, such that j+k ≤ r < sl1 ≤ ℓ+k <
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sl2. Note that at round sl1 the voting phase is still on, therefore P(C1, B
⋆
j ) = voting. By round
sl2, the voting phase is complete and in case P(C2, B
⋆
j ) = accept the block Bj is replaced by
B⋆j in C2. However, in chain C
⌈k
1 the j-th block is still Bj, since the edit of B
⋆
j is waiting to be
confirmed. Therefore, C
⌈k
1 ⊀ C2, thereby violating Definition 4.
The pitfall in Definition 4 is that it does not account for edits or modifications in the chain.
We therefore introduce a new definition that is suited for an editable blockchain (with respect
to an editing policy). The formal definition follows.
Definition 5 (Editable Common prefix). The chains C1, C2 of length l1 and l2, respectively,
possessed by two honest parties at the onset of the slots sl1 ≤ sl2 satisfy one of the following:
1. C
⌈k
1  C2, or
2. for each B⋆j ∈ C
⌈(l2−l1)+k
2 such that B
⋆
j /∈ C
⌈k
1 , it must be the case that P(C2, B
⋆
j ) = accept,
for j ∈ [l1 − k],
where C
⌈(l2−l1)+k
2 denotes the chain obtained by pruning the last (l2 − l1) + k blocks from C2, P
denotes the chain policy, and k ∈ N denotes the common prefix parameter.
Intuitively, the above definition states that if there exists a block that violates the common
prefix as defined in Definition 4, then it must be the case that this block is an edited block
whose adoption was voted and approved according to the policy P in chain C2. We show that
our protocol Γ′ satisfies Definition 5 next.
Theorem 3. Let H be a collision-resistant hash function. If Γ satisfies k-common prefix, then
Γ′P satisfies k-editable common prefix for a (k, ℓ, ρ)-policy.
Proof. If no edits were performed in a chain C, then the protocol Γ′P behaves exactly like the
immutable protocol Γ, and henceforth the common prefix property follows directly.
However, in case of an edit, consider an adversary A that proposes a candidate block B⋆j to
edit Bj in chain C2, which is later edited by an honest party P2 at slot sl2. Observe that by the
collision resistance property of H, A is not able to efficiently produce another candidate block
B˜⋆j 6= B
⋆
j such that H(B˜
⋆
j ) = H(B
⋆
j ). Therefore, since P2 is honest and adopted the edit B
⋆
j
in C2, it must be the case that B
⋆
j received enough votes such that P(C2, B
⋆
j ) = accept. This
concludes the proof.
How the properties play together : By showing that Γ′ satisfies the three aforementioned proper-
ties, we show that Γ′P is a live and persistent blockchain protocol immutable against edits not
authorised by the policy P.
The editable common prefix property ensures that only policy approved edits are performed
on the chain. The Chain quality property, for a (k, ℓ, ρ)-policy P where ρ > µ, ensures that an
adversary does not get a disproportionate contribution of blocks to the chain.
5 Integrating into Bitcoin
In this section we describe how our generic editable blockchain protocol (Fig. 2) can be integrated
into Bitcoin. For simplicity, we consider one redaction per block and the redaction is performed
on one or more transactions included in the block. The extension of the generic protocol for
multiple redactions (described in Appendix A) can be immediately applied to the construction
described in this section. Next, we give a brief background on the Bitcoin protocol.
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Tx
in: . . .
out-script: τ1
amount: α1
witness: . . .
Tx′
in: TxID
out-script: τ2
amount: α2
witness: x, s.t ., τ1(x) = 1
Figure 3: The structure of a transaction in Bitcoin. The transaction Tx′ is spending the output
τ1 of transaction Tx.
5.1 Bitcoin Basics
Transactions. A simple transaction Tx in Bitcoin has the following basic structure: an input
script, an output script with a corresponding amount, and a witness. More complex transactions
may have multiple input and output scripts and/or more complex scripts. A transaction Tx′
that spends some output τ of Tx, has the ID of Tx in its input, denoted by TxID := H(Tx), and
a witness x that satisfies the output script τ of Tx (as shown in Fig. 3). The amount α2 being
spent by the output script τ2 needs to be smaller (or equal) than the amount α1 of τ1. The
most common output scripts in Bitcoin consists of a public key, and the witness x is a signature
of the transaction computed using the corresponding secret key. We refer the reader to [1] for
a comprehensive overview of the Bitcoin scripting language.
Insertion of Data. Users are allowed to propose new transactions containing arbitrary data,
that are then sent to the Bitcoin network for a small fee. Data can be inserted into specific
parts of a Bitcoin transaction, namely the output script, input script and witness. Matzutt
et al. [34] provide a quantitative analysis of data insertion methods in Bitcoin. According to
their analysis, OP RETURN and coinbase transactions are the major pockets apart from some
non-standard transactions, where data is inserted.
Block Structure. A Bitcoin block consists of two parts, namely the block header, and a list
of all transactions within the block. The structure of the block header is detailed in Fig. 6,
whereas a pictorial representation of the list of transactions can be found in Fig. 7.
5.2 Modifying the Bitcoin Protocol
In this section we detail the modifications to the Bitcoin protocol necessary to integrate it to
our generic editable blockchain protocol of Section 3. The resulting protocol is a version of
Bitcoin that allows for redaction of (harmful) data from its transactions.
By redaction of transactions, we mean removing data from a transaction without making
other changes to the remaining components of the transaction. As shown in Fig. 5a, consider a
transaction Tx1 that contains some harmful data in its output script, and let Tx
⋆
1 be a candidate
transaction to replace Tx in the chain, where Tx⋆1 is exactly the same as Tx1, except that the
harmful data is removed ( Fig. 5b).
editTx
in: . . .
out-script: Tx1ID ,Tx
⋆
1ID
witness: . . .
Figure 4: The special transaction editTx is broadcasted to the network to propose a redaction
of transaction Tx1 for the candidate transaction Tx
⋆
1.
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Tx1
in: . . .
out-script 1: τ1
amount: α1
out-script 2: τ2, harmful data
witness: x
(a) Non-redacted
Tx⋆1
in: . . .
out-script 1: τ1
amount: α1
out-script 2: τ3, harmful data
witness: x
(b) After Redaction
Figure 5: (a) The transaction Tx1 contains harmful data, and (b) the candidate transaction
Tx⋆1 contains a copy of all the fields of Tx1, with exception of the harmful data.
Proposing Redactions. A user who wishes to propose a redaction proceeds as follows: First,
constructs a special transaction editTx (as shown in Fig. 4) containing Tx1ID and Tx
⋆
1ID
, that
respectively denotes the hash of the transaction Tx1 being redacted, and the hash of Tx
⋆
1 that is
the candidate transaction to replace Tx1 in the chain
5. Then, broadcasts the special transaction
editTx and the candidate transaction Tx⋆1 to the network; editTx requires a transaction fee to
be included in the blockchain, while Tx⋆1 is added to a pool of candidate transactions
6. The
candidate transaction Tx⋆1 is validated by checking its contents with respect to Tx1, and if it is
valid, then it can be considered for voting.
Redaction Policy. The redactable Bitcoin protocol is parameterised by a policy parameter P
(Definition 1). The policy P dictates the requirements and constraints for redaction operations
in the blockchain. An informal description of a (basic) policy for Bitcoin would be:
A proposed redaction is approved valid if the following conditions hold:
• It is identical to the transaction being replaced, except that it can remove data.
• It can only remove data that can never be spent, e.g., OP RETURN output scripts.
• It does not redact votes for other redactions in the chain.
• It received more than 50% of votes in the 1024 consecutive blocks (voting period) after
the corresponding editTx is stable in the chain.
where voting for a candidate transaction Tx⋆1 simply means that the miner includes editTxID =
H(Tx1ID ||Tx
⋆
1ID
) in the coinbase (transaction) of the new block he produces. After the voting
phase is over, the candidate transaction is removed from the candidate pool.
The reason for restricting the redactions to non-spendable components of a transaction (e.g.,
OP RETURN) is that, permitting redactions on spendable content could lead to potential misuse
(Section 7) and future inconsistencies within the chain. We stress however, that this is not a
technical limitation of our solution, but rather a mechanism to remove the burden of the user
on deciding what redactions could cause inconsistencies on the chain in the future. We feel that
the aforementioned policy is suitable for Bitcoin, but as policies are highly dependent on the
application, a different policy can be better suited for different settings.
New Block Structure. To account for redactions, the block header must accommodate
an additional field called old merkle root. When a block is initially created, i.e., prior to any
redaction, this new field takes the same value as merkle root. For a redaction request on block
Bj, that proposes to replace Tx1 with the candidate transaction Tx
⋆
1, the transactions list of
the candidate block B⋆j (that will replace Bj) must contain Tx1ID = H(Tx1) in addition to
5We note that our transaction ID is Segwit compatible, as the witness is not used with the hash H to generate
a transaction’s ID.
6If a candidate transaction does not have a corresponding editTx in the blockchain then the transaction is not
included in the candidate pool, and it is treated as spam instead.
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the remaining transactions. A new merkle root is computed for the new set of transactions,
while old merkle root remains unchanged. To draw parallels with the abstraction we described
in Section 3.1, G(s, x) is analogous to merkle root and y is analogous to old merkle root.
Value Description
hash prev hash of the previous block header
merkle root root of the merkle tree (whose the leaves are the
transactions)
difficulty the difficulty of the proof-of-work
timestamp the timestamp of the block
nonce nonce used in proof-of-work
old merkle root root of the merkle tree of old set of transactions
Figure 6: Structure of the Bitcoin block header. The last highlighted field (old merke root) is
only included in the block header of the extended (editable) protocol.
Block Validation. The validation of a block consists of the steps described below.
• Validating transactions: The block validates all the transactions contained in its transac-
tions list; the validation of non-redacted transactions is performed in the same way as in
the immutable version of the protocol. Transactions that have been previously redacted
require a special validation that we describe next. Consider the case presented in Fig. 5,
where Tx1 is replaced by Tx
⋆
1. The witness x was generated with respect to Tx1ID and
is not valid with respect to Tx⋆1ID . Fortunately, the old state Tx1ID (hash of the redacted
transaction) is stored, as shown in Fig. 7b, ensuring that the witness x can be successfully
validated with respect to the old version of the transaction. Therefore, we can ensure
that all the transactions included in the block have a valid witness, or in case of redacted
transactions, the old version of the transaction had a valid witness. To verify that the
redaction was approved in the chain one needs to find a corresponding editTx (Fig. 4) in
the chain, and verify that it satisfies the chain’s policy.
• PoW verification: The procedure to verify the PoW puzzle is described in Algorithm 2.
If the block contains an edited transaction, i.e., old merkle root 6= merkle root, then sub-
stitute the value in hash merkle root with that in old merkle root and check if the hash of
this new header is within T .
Tx1
Tx2
Tx3
...
(a) Non-redacted.
Tx⋆1,Tx1ID
Tx2
Tx3
.
..
(b) Redacted transaction Tx1.
Figure 7: List of transactions contained within a block before (left) and after (right) redacting
a transaction in the block.
Chain Validation. To validate a full chain a miner needs to validate all the blocks within the
chain. The miner can detect if a block has been redacted by verifying its hash link with the next
block; in case of a redacted block, the miner verifies if the redaction was approved according
to the chain’s policy. The miner rejects a chain as invalid if any of the following holds: (1)
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a block’s redaction was not approved according to the policy, (2) the merkle root value of the
redacted block is incorrect with respect to the set of transactions (that contains the hash of the
redacted transaction) or (3) a previously approved redaction was not performed on the chain.
Transaction Consistency. Removing a transaction entirely or changing spendable data
of a transaction may result in serious inconsistencies in the chain. For example, consider a
transaction Tx1 that has two outputs denoted by A and B, where the second output B has a
data entry and the first output A contains a valid spendable script that will be eventually spent
by some other transaction Tx′. If the redaction operation performed on Tx1 affects the output
script of A, Tx′ may become invalid, causing other transactions to become invalid. A similar
problem may arise if the redaction is performed on the input part of Tx1 enabling the user who
generated Tx1 to possibly double spend the funds. Therefore, we only allow redactions that do
not affect a transaction’s consistency with past and future events.
Redaction and Retrievability. The redaction policy P for Bitcoin restricts redactions to
only those operations that do not violate a transaction’s consistency. This means that we do not
allow monetary transactions to be edited (such as standard coin transfer). We stress, however
that the main objective of redacting a transaction Tx is to prevent some malicious content x,
that is stored inside Tx, from being broadcasted as part of the chain, thereby ensuring that the
chain and its users are legally compliant. Note that we cannot prevent an adversary from locally
storing and retrieving the data x, even after its redaction, since the content was publicly stored
in the blockchain. In this case, the user that willingly keeps the malicious (and potentially
illegal) data x will be liable.
Accountability. Our proposal offers accountability during and after the voting phase is
over. Moreover, the accountability during the voting phase prevents the problem of transaction
inconsistencies discussed above.
• Voting Phase Accountability : During the voting phase, anyone can verify all the details of
a redaction request. The old transaction and the proposed modification (via the candidate
transaction) are up for public scrutiny. It is publicly observable if a miner misbehaves by
voting for a redaction request that, apart from removing data, also tampers with the input
or (a spendable) output of the transaction, in turn affecting its transaction consistency.
This could discourage users from using the system due to its unreliability as a public
ledger for monetary purposes. Since the miners are heavily invested in the system and
are expected to behave rationally, they would not vote for such an edit request (that is
against the policy) during the voting phase.
• Victim Accountability : After a redaction is performed, our protocol allows the data owner,
whose data was removed, to claim that it was indeed her data that was removed. Since
we store the hash of the old transaction along with the candidate transaction in the
edited block (refer to Fig. 7b), it is possible for a user that possesses the old data (that
was removed) to verify it against the hash that is stored in the redacted block. This
enforces accountability on the miners of the network who vote for a redaction request by
discouraging them from removing benign data. At the same time, our protocol guarantees
protection against false claims, as the hash verification would fail.
6 Proof-of-Concept Implementation
In this section we report on a Python proof-of-concept implementation used for evaluating our
approach. We implement a full-fledged Blockchain system based on Python 3 that mimics all
the basic functionalities of Bitcoin. Specifically, we include a subset of Bitcoin’s script language
that allows us to insert arbitrary data into the chain, which can be redacted afterwards. The
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Figure 8: The graphs above show the overhead (in percentage) of our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation in each experiment performed. In (a) the graph shows the validation time overhead
required to validate a redactable chain (with no redactions) compared to an immutable chain; in
(b) the graph shows the validation time overhead required to validate a chain for an increasing
number of redactions, compared to a redactable chain with no redactions, and finally in (c) the
graph shows the validation time overhead required to validate a chain (with 1% of the blocks
redacted) for increasing voting periods, compared to a chain (with 1% of the blocks redacted)
on a fixed voting period of ℓ = 5.
redacting mechanism is built upon the proposed modifications to Bitcoin that we describe
in Section 5. For conceptual simplicity we rely on PoW as the consensus mechanism.
6.1 Benchmarking
We detail the performance achieved by our implementation running several experiments. The
benchmarking was performed in a virtual environment on a Linux server with the following
specifications.
• Intel Xeon Gold 6132 CPU @ 2.60GHz
• 128GB of RAM
• Debian Linux 4.9.0-6-amd64
• Python 3.5.3.
We measure the run time of Algorithm 1 by validating chains of varying lengths (i.e., number
of blocks) and with different numbers of redactions in the chain. For each experiment, a new
chain is created and validated 50 times, then the arithmetic mean of the run time is taken
over all runs. Each chain consists of up to 50, 000 blocks, where each block contains 1, 000
transactions. Note that a chain of size 50, 000 blocks approximates a one year snapshot of the
bitcoin blockchain.
The great variation of the results shown in the experiments is due to the randomness involved
in the chain creation and validation process, since each chain will contain its own set of (different)
transactions, slightly influencing the run time.
Overhead Compared to Immutable Blockchain. For the first series of experiments,
we generate chains of length ranging from 10, 000 up to 50, 000 blocks. We generate both,
immutable and redactable chains (with no redactions). The goal here is to measure the over-
head that comes with the integration of our redactable blockchain protocol with an immutable
blockchain when there are no redactions performed. The results in Fig. 8a indicate that there
is only a tiny overhead. Interestingly, we note that as the size of the chain grows, the overhead
tends to get smaller; this is because on a chain without redactions the only extra step required
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is to check if there are any votes in the coinbase transaction of a new block, what becomes
negligible compared to the verification time as the chain grows larger.
Overhead by Number of Redactions. For the second series of experiments, we generate
redactable chains with the number of redactions ranging from 2% (1, 000 redactions) to 10%
(5, 000 redactions) of the blocks. The redacted transactions within a block contains dummy data
consisting of 4 bytes that are removed during the experiment. This experiment is intended to
measure the overhead with respect to the number of redactions performed in a chain compared
to a redactable chain with no redactions. The results in Fig. 8b show that the overhead tends
to be at most linear in the number of redactions, since in our prototype instead of looking
ahead whether there is a redaction request and a sufficient number of votes, we keep track of
the redaction request and wait for its votes and eventual confirmation.
Overhead by the Voting Parameters ℓ and ρ. In the last series of experiments, we
consider chains with 1% of the blocks redacted. We vary the voting period ℓ to measure how
it influences the validation time compared to a chain with 1% of blocks redacted but with a
voting period of ℓ = 5. The threshold of votes ρ is set to
(
⌊ ℓ2⌋+ 1
)
/ℓ (i.e., requiring majority
number of blocks in the voting period to contain votes for approving a redaction). The results
in Fig. 8c show that the overhead is very small (even negligible for small sizes of ℓ) and tends
to be at most linear in ℓ. This meets our expectations, since the overhead in validation time
originates from keeping and increasing the voting counts over the voting period ℓ. In the worst
case, where ρ = 1 we need to keep track of the voting count over the entire voting period.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss some of the generic attacks on our system and how it is immune to
such attacks.
Unapproved Editing. A malicious miner could pass off an edit on the blockchain that does
not satisfy the network’s policy. This can occur if the miner presents the blockchain with an
edit that has not been considered for voting, or has gathered insufficient votes. In any of the
above cases, it is possible for any user in the network to account for an edit by verifying in the
chain if the exact edit presented by the miner is approved or not. And since majority of the
miners in the network is honest, the user accepts an approved edit as an honest edit.
Scrutiny of Candidate Blocks. It is in the interest of the (honest) miners and the system
as a whole, to actively scrutinise a candidate block and decide on voting based on its merit.
Therefore, the miners are strongly discouraged from using a default strategy in voting, e.g.,
always vote for a candidate block without scrutiny, using a pre-determined strategy that is
agnostic to what the candidate block is proposing.
Denial of Service. A malicious miner may try to flood the network with edit requests as an
attempt to slow down transaction confirmation in the chain. However, the miner is deterred
from doing this because he incurs the cost of a transaction fee for the editTx that is part of his
edit request similar to other standard transactions. Moreover, it may also be the case for the
editTx to incur a higher transaction fee as a strong deterrent against spamming.
False Victim. A malicious user may wrongly claim that a particular transaction related
to him was edited. For example, he may claim that some monetary information was changed
where he was the beneficiary. Since such an edit could affect the trust in the system, the user
could potentially affect the credibility of the entire system. We prevent such an attack through
victim accountability of our protocol. We can verify the user’s claim against the hash of the old
version of the transaction that is stored in the chain itself. Given the hash function is collision
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resistant, a wrong claim would fail the check.
Double Spend Attacks. Consider a scenario where a malicious user is the recipient of a
transaction. If this transaction was edited by removing some data stored in it, the hash of the
new version of the transaction is different. If the miner had already spent the funds from the
old version of this transaction, after the edit, he may attempt a double spend by exploiting the
new version of the transaction. This is prevented by associating the new version and the old
version of the edited transaction with each other, thereby noticing such a double spend. If the
funds had already been spent, the old version would be a spent transaction. Because the edit
that is performed does not conflict with the consistency of the transaction, the new version of
the transaction would also be a spent transaction.
Consensus delays. Consider a scenario where two different users hold chains with a different
set of redacted blocks, and therefore cannot arrive at a consensus on the final state of the chain,
what may result in delays. Assuming the miners have not locally redacted blocks on their
own and have behaved honestly according to the protocol, this scenario would mean that the
different set of redacted blocks in the chains held by the two miners have been approved by the
policy. However, this would be a blatant violation of the Editable common prefix property of
our protocol (Theorem 3).
8 Related work
Bitcoin and Applications. Several works [8, 12, 40] have analysed the properties and ex-
tended the features of the Bitcoin protocol. Bitcoin as a public bulletin board has found several
innovative applications far beyond its initial scope, e.g., to achieve fairness and correctness
in secure multi-party computation [9, 7, 15, 31], to build smart contracts [30], to distributed
cryptography [6], and more [32, 29, 16].
Content Insertion in Bitcoin. There have been several works [13, 35, 36, 42, 44, 45] on
analysing and assessing the consequences of content insertions in public blockchains. They shed
light on the distribution and the usage of such inserted data entries. The most recent work
of Matzutt et al. [34] gives a comprehensive quantitative analysis of illicit content insertions
including, insertion techniques, potential risks and rational incentives. They also show that
compared to other attacks [20, 24] on Bitcoin system, illicit content insertion can pose immediate
risks to all users of the system.
Proactive Countermeasures. Proactive measures to detect illicit material circulated in the
network and detecting them have been studied [43, 27, 25]. In a blockchain setting, preventive
solutions [19, 17, 37] focus on maintaining only monetary information instead of the entire
ledger history. Matzutt et al. [33] use a rational approach of discouraging miners from inserting
harmful content into the blockchain. They advocate a minimum transaction fee and mitigation
of transaction manipulatability as a deterrent for the same.
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A Protocol extension for multiple redactions
In this section we sketch an extension to the protocol of Fig. 2 to accommodate multiple redac-
tions per block.
The intuition behind the extension is simple enough to be explained in this paragraph; a
block can potentially be redacted n times and each redaction B⋆j of the block Bj that is approved
must contain information about the entire history of previous redactions. In our extension, this
information is stored in the y⋆j component of the candidate block B
⋆
j . We now sketch the
required protocol changes.
Proposing an Edit. To propose a redaction for block Bj := 〈sj, xj , ctr j, yj〉 the user
must build a candidate block B⋆j of the following form: B
⋆
j := 〈sj, x
⋆
j , ctr j , y
⋆
j 〉, where y
⋆
j :=
yj||G(sj , xj) iff yj 6= G(sj , xj). Note that for the first redaction of Bj , we have that yj =
G(sj , xj), and therefore y
⋆
j := G(sj , xj).
Block Validation. To validate a block, the users run the validateBlockExt algorithm described
in Algorithm 5. Intuitively, the algorithm performs the same operations as Algorithm 2, except
that it takes into account the possibility of the block being redacted multiple times. Observe
that by parsing y as y(1)||y(2)||...||y(l), we are considering a block that has been redacted a total
of l times and y(1) denotes the original state information of the unredacted version of the block.
Algorithm 5: validateBlockExt
input : Block B := 〈s, x, ctr , y〉.
output: {0, 1}
1: Validate data x, if invalid return 0;
2: Parse y as y(1)||y(2)||...||y(l), where y
(i)
j ∈ {0, 1}
κ ∀i ∈ [l];
3: if (H(ctr , G(s, x), y) < D) ∨ (H(ctr , y(1), y(1)) < D)
4: then return 1;
5: else return 0;
Voting for Candidate Blocks. To vote for a redaction, we additionally define the following
interface.
• H(ctr , G(s, x⋆), y⋆) ← Γ′.Vt(B⋆): takes as input a candidate block B⋆ and parses B⋆ as
(s, x⋆, ctr , y⋆). It outputs the hash value H(ctr , G(s, x⋆), y⋆) as a vote for the candidate
block B⋆.
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Algorithm 6: validateCandExt
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n, and a candidate block B
⋆
j for an edit.
output: {0, 1}
1: Parse B⋆j := 〈sj , x
⋆
j , ctr j , yj〉;
2: Parse yj as y
(1)
j ||y
(2)
j ||...||y
(l)
j , where y
(i)
j ∈ {0, 1}
κ ∀i ∈ [l];
3: if Γ′.validateBlockExt(B⋆j ) = 0 then return 0;
4: Parse Bj−1 := 〈sj−1, xj−1, ctr j−1, yj−1〉;
5: Parse yj−1 as y
(1)
j−1||y
(2)
j−1||...||y
(l′)
j−1 , where y
(i)
j−1 ∈ {0, 1}
κ ∀i ∈ [l′];
6: Parse Bj+1 := 〈sj+1, xj+1, ctr j+1, yj+1〉;
7: if sj 6= H(ctr j−1, y
(1)
j−1, y
(1)
j−1) ∨ sj+1 6= H(ctr j , y
(1)
j , y
(1)
j ) then return 0;
8: for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} do
9: if the fraction of votes for H(ctr , y
(i)
j , y
(1)
j || . . . ||y
(i−1)
j ) in the chain C is not at least ρ within its
voting period of ℓ blocks then return 0;
10: return 1
Algorithm 7: validateChainExt
input : Chain C = (B1, · · · , Bn) of length n.
output: {0, 1}
1: j := n;
2: if j = 1 then return Γ′.validateBlockExt(B1);
3: while j ≥ 2 do
4: Bj := 〈sj , xj , ctr j , yj〉 ; ⊲ Bj := Head(C) when j = n
5: Bj−1: := 〈sj−1, xj−1, ctr j−1, yj−1〉;
6: Parse yj as y
(1)
j || . . . ||y
(l)
j , where y
(i)
j ∈ {0, 1}
κ ∀i ∈ [l];
7: Parse yj−1 as y
(1)
j−1|| . . . ||y
(l′)
j−1, where y
(i)
j−1 ∈ {0, 1}
κ ∀i ∈ [l′];
8: if Γ′.validateBlockExt(Bj) = 0 then return 0;
9: if sj = H(ctr j−1, G(sj−1, xj−1), yj−1) then j := j − 1;
10: else if sj = H(ctr j−1, y
(1)
j−1, y
(1)
j−1) ∧ Γ
′.validateCandExt(C, Bj−1) = 1 ∧ P(C,Bj−1) = accept then
j := j − 1;
11: else return 0;
12: return 1;
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The voting interface is invoked by users that wish to endorse a candidate block by including
a vote in the newly mined block (if the candidate block is still in its voting phase). Accordingly
the policy P of the chain for redactions checks if a candidate block has received at least a ratio
of ρ votes (as output by the Γ′.Vt) in a span of ℓ blocks after immediately its proposal.
Candidate Block Validation. If a block Bj is being redacted more than once, then the cor-
responding candidate block B⋆j needs to be validated for accounting for the multiple redactions
that happened before; for each redaction of Bj , the votes for that redaction must exist in the
chain C. validateCandExt (described in Algorithm 6) validates such a candidate block.
Chain Validation. To validate a chain, the user runs the validateChainExt algorithm (de-
scribed in Algorithm 7). The only change compared to Algorithm 1 is that now yj is parsed as
y
(1)
j || . . . ||y
(l)
j where the initial unredacted state of the block is stored in y
(1).
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